Abstract: This paper studies the role of consequences in a person's decision to lie. Based on findings from an experiment with a deception game, as well as from questionnaires, I
Introduction
Deception is part of many economic interactions. Businesspeople, politicians, diplomats, lawyers, and students in the experimental laboratory who make use of private information do not always do so honestly (DePaulo and Kashy, 1998) . This observation contradicts the moral approach to deception. As St. Augustine wrote: "To me, however, it seems certain that every lie is a sin…" (St. Augustine, 421) . Later, philosophers like Kant (1787) likewise took this extreme moral approach when arguing against lying.
At the other extreme, economic theory is built on the assumption of "homo economicus," a figure who acts selfishly and is unconcerned about the well being of others. 2 An implication of this assumption is that lies will be told whenever it is beneficial for the liar, regardless of the effect on the other party. 3 Another implication is that there is no negative outcome associated with lying per se. This assumption is very useful in many economic models. In contract theory it is assumed that without an explicit contract, the sides will not fulfill their respective obligations. For example, Akerlof's (1970) paper on asymmetric information and 1 Remarks by the President Bush about Enron, at Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award Ceremony, Washington Hilton Hotel, March 7, 2002. 2 Important deviations from this assumption in economic modeling are Arrow's (1972) discussion of trust, Becker's (1976) modeling of altruistic preferences, and Akerlof's (1982) study of the fair-wage hypothesis. For a general discussions see Becker (1993) directions "…the economic approach I refer to does not assume that individuals are motivated solely by selfishness or material gain. It is a method of analysis, not an assumption about particular motivations. Along with others, I have tried to pry economists away from narrow assumptions about self-interest. Behavior is driven by a much richer set of values and preferences" (p. 385). More recent models relaxing this assumption are discussed below. 3 Note that this does not mean that a completely selfish person will always lie. There might be strategic reasons not to lie. For example, see the Kreps and Wilson (1982) discussion of reputation and imperfect information in addition to the related experiment reported in Camerer and Weigelt (1988) .
the market for lemons assumed that sellers of used cars would always lie if it is to their benefit. In the literature on tax evasion, the choice of whether to avoid paying taxes is considered a decision under uncertainty; cost is treated as the product of being caught and punished, whereas benefit is simply the money saved by nonpayment. There is no cost associated with the very act of lying (Alingham and Sandmo, 1972) . Another example is the game theoretic treatment of "cheap talk" (see Rabin, 1996 for a survey).
An intermediate approach is taken by utilitarian philosophers (e.g., Bentham, 1789) .
According to utilitarianism, in choosing whether to lie, we weigh benefits against harm and happiness against unhappiness. Similar to the economic theory approach, this type of calculation implies that lies, apart from their resultant harm and benefit, are in themselves neutral. A lie and a truthful statement that achieve the same utility (not necessarily the same monetary payoffs) are equivalent (Bok, 1978, chapter 4) . This is a consequentialist approach.
An alternative approach that distinguishes between two decisions with the same payoff set according to the process leading to the outcomes is called non-consequentialist.
St. Augustine's approach is normative in the sense of "this is what a person should do." 4 His injunction is (unfortunately?) not supported by casual observation of real life: People do lie. Economic theory is normative in the sense of "this is what a rational economic agent should do." This approach is also not supported by casual observation: Even economists tell the truth from time to time, absent any strategic justification for doing so. The utilitarian approach predicts that if people do care about the well being of others, the decision whether to lie or not may depend on the cost to the other side. 5 As a result people will not be at the 4 Although Augustine was categorically against lies, he distinguished between different types of lies. The continuation of the citation reads "…though it makes a great difference with what intention and on what subject one lies." Similarly, although Jewish texts prohibit lying, certain lies, especially those told to preserve the household unity, are regarded as exceptions (Jacobs, 1960) . 5 For empirical support of the assumption that people do care about other's payoff see Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) , Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) , Dawes and Thaler (1988) , Rabin (1993) , and Andreoni (1990 Andreoni ( , 1995 .
extreme of either always lying or always telling the truth. However, as will be shown below, people do distinguish between decisions even when the choices do not defer in outcomes. In particular, people are less likely to choose the outcome that maximizes their own monetary payoff if it involves a lie than if it involves " innocent" choice. Hence the consequentialism assumption of utilitarian is rejected.
I start the investigation by empirically studying the role of consequences in the decision whether to lie. 6 I consider a two-person interaction in which lying increases the payoffs for the liar at the expense of her counterpart. How do changes in relative payoffs influence this decision? The main empirical finding is that people not only care about their own gain from lying, they are also sensitive to how harmful lying is to the other side. Distributional models do not capture this effect although they assume inequality aversion (people are unreceptive to others earning more money than they do). This "envy" assumption is almost a polar opposite of the "aversion to doing harm" observed in the deception environment: The decision maker prefers not to lie when a lie increases her payoff a bit yet reduces the other's payoff by a great deal.
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To structure this observation, I propose a form of deception preferences in which a potential liar is assumed to be sensitive to the increase in her payoff associated with a lie but also to the decrease in payoff to the other side. Preferences of this type organize the data well, and for a given environment, predict the changes in the propensity of people to lie when relative and absolute payoffs are altered.
6 Many other aspects of deception are studied in the literature. Psychologists study personality characteristic of honesty (Hartshorne and May, 1928) , how to detect lies (Ekman, 1992 , Vrij, 2001 , how children learn to lie (Sodian, 1991 ), etc. See Ford (1995 for an introduction to the psychology of deceit, and DePaulo, Kashy, KirKendol, Wyer, and Epstein (1996) for a taxonomy of lies and their classifications according to content, motivation and magnitude. In accounting, Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser (2001) examine how preferences for wealth and honesty affect managerial reporting (see also the discussions by Baiman and Lewis, 1989, and Koford and Penno, 1992) . In business, research focuses on deception in negotiation (e.g., Schweitzer and Croson, 1999, and Robinson, Lewicki, and Donahue, 2000) . For what I find the most thoughtful modern treatment on the morality of deception, see Bok (1978) , and particularly chapter 4. 7 As will be discussed below assuming altruism or "matching intentions" does not work here either.
Finally, I show that cost-benefit analyses of consequences of deception are subjective, that is, they do not depend solely on actual payoffs. For example, employer-employee relations are generally marked by asymmetry in wealth. An employee may feel that her $100 gain has more "impact" than her employer's $1,000 loss. Moreover, since the judgment is subjective, self-serving biases may come into play, which make deception more likely an option. 
Definition and classification of deception and lies
It is interesting to note that the literature offers many definitions of deception and lies.
These can differ, for example, by whether the liar's intentions are considered. 9 Mitchell (1986) defines deception as "a false communication that tends to benefit the communicator."
This definition implies that not only humans lie but plants do too. Note that this definition assumes that the lie increases the liar's payoff. This definition is problematic because it implies that unconsciously and mistakenly misleading others is also deception. Krauss (1981) defines deception as "an act that is intended to foster in another person a belief or understanding which the deceiver consider to be false." This definition ignores a different aspect of deception, highlighted by Ekman (1992) : people lie only when they do not inform others about their intention to lie in advance. Magicians, therefore, do not lie. Ekman (1992) defines deception as "a deliberate choice to mislead a target without giving any notification of the intent to do so." Vrij (2001) instance, a white lie that costs the liar nothing and makes the counterpart feel good ("You look great today!"). In the second category I consider lies that help the other person even if it harms the liar. The motivation for this lie may be pure altruism (Becker 1976) , an impure motive according to which people enjoy the act of giving (Andreoni, 1990) , or an "efficiency motive," according to which people prefer outcomes that enlarge total surplus (Charness and Rabin, 2001 ). In the third category a lie may not help the liar but can harm both sides or at least the other part. The motive for this might be a spiteful reaction to an unfair behavior by the other side, for example.
The fourth category I consider includes lies that increase the payoff to the liar and decrease the payoff to the other side. I would argue that this is the relevant category for many economic issues, such as contract theory. If person A signs a contract with Person B, it is simply to prevent B from acting in ways that will increase her payoff at the expense of A's payoff.
In this paper I focus on the fourth category of lies, those that help the liar at the expense of the counterpart. The discussion will be devoted to the influence of different consequences of this kind of lying on the decision whether to lie. Hence, the working definition of deception I use in this paper, (based on Vrij, 2001 10 See Lewicki (1983) , DePaulo, Kashy, KirKendol, Wyer, and Epstein (1996) , and Schweitzer (2001) .
Empirical findings
The purpose of the current paper is to study empirically the role of consequences on behavior in the case where a lie increases the payoff to the liar at the expense of the other side. To this aim I conducted an experiment in which I altered the absolute and relative consequences of lies, and then measured the effect of the change on the subjects' propensity to lie. Experiments are important because they allow us to observe actual behavior under conditions where this behavior has real monetary consequences for the participants. This is the reason why experiments with real monetary incentives are major tools for collecting data on economic behavior.
In addition to using experiments with real monetary incentives, it is my belief that finding out what people say about the importance of costs to the receiving end on the fairness of a lie is interesting. To examine this issue I constructed questionnaires involving "real life"
scenarios. This method is well established in psychology, and has been used in economics (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986 study of fairness).
I now turn to a description of the empirical findings.
The experiment The Salesperson game
You wish to buy a new vacuum cleaner. There are two vacuums you are considering.
Consulting with a salesperson she recommends one "because it is better." Should you follow the advice? Maybe she is paid a higher commission for this product, and that is why she recommends it? Similarly, imagine that you go to a tourist's restaurant and the waiter recommends the lobster. Are you going to follow her recommendation? If you think the waiter recommended it because she thinks it is better, you would. But what if she recommended it simply because the cook told her that the lobster is not fresh, and must be sold today?
When are the salesperson and the waiter more likely to lie?
Procedure
The participants were 450 undergraduate students at the Technion and the University of Haifa. Students volunteered to participate in the experiment after class. They were told that the experiment will take about 15 minutes, and that everyone would be paid. In the instructions (see Appendix 1) for both player 1 and player 2, it was written that there are two possible outcomes to the experiment. Although the actual choice between the options was to be made by player 2, only player 1 was informed about the monetary consequences of each option. The rule were made known to both participants. After reading the instructions, player 1 was asked to send one of two possible messages to player 2:
Message 1: "Option A will earn you more money than option B." Or Message 2: ""Option B will earn you more money than option A."
This message was the only information player 2 had about the payoffs.
In all three treatments payoffs were constructed such that if option A was chosen, player 1 earned less than if option B was chosen, and the reverse for player 2 (recall that player 2 did not know that the payoffs were inverse). As a result, message 2 was not true, and the payoff associated with it for player 1 was larger than the payoffs associated with message 1.
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Actual payoffs used in the experiment are presented in Table 1 (75 pairs per 
Prediction with the assumption of rational expectations and selfishness
This is a game of asymmetric information in which we have no knowledge of the beliefs of player 2; hence finding the game-theoretic equilibria with selfish players is not trivial. For the purpose of this discussion I analyze the game as a decision problem for player 1 in the following sense: I assume that player 1 has rational expectations regarding player 2's decision. That is, player 1 guesses correctly the action of player 2 given the respective message. If that is the case, and player 1 is selfish, then she will always choose the outcome that maximizes her expected payoff. As it turned out, 78% of the participants in the role of 11 That is, "Message 1 = Truth" and "Message 2= Lie." player 2 followed the message sent by player 1 and chose the option in which player 1 told them they would earn more money. That is, player 2 chose the option "recommended" by player 1's message. Moreover, 50 participants in the role of player 1 were asked to guess player 2's choice. Of these, 41 (82%) said that they expected player 2 to follow the message sent by them.
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To further test this assumption, the treatment was repeated with another group of 50 participants who played the role of player 1. After making their choices, they were told that we had already conducted the experiment with player 2 (the original instructions were adapted such that this would not contradict what they had been told previously). They were told that the player 2 they were matched with has chosen to follow the message they had sent.
They were then asked whether they wished to reconsider their previous choice. Three (6%) chose to change their message: One moved from telling the truth to lying, and two moved the other way.
To conclude, within the context of the experiment, if player 1 is simply interested in maximizing her own payoffs, and she has rational expectations about the reaction of player 2 to the message she sends, she should always lie. Furthermore, player 1 understands this. I find this property compelling because it helps separate strategic motives from fairness motives. Because player 1 expects the lie to "work," she is concerned only with the fairness of lying.
Results
The results of the experiment, in terms of the fraction of players 1 who lied, are presented in Figure 1 . The figure is constructed such that the gain from lying for player 1 (∆x) is plotted on the horizontal axis of Figure 1 , and the gain for lying for player 2 (∆y) on 12 They were paid for accuracy according to the incentive scheme described in Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) .
the vertical axis (note that the gain for player 2 is negative). This kind of presentation will be the basis for the preference formulation below. In treatment 1, where the gain for player 1 was 1 and the loss for player 2 was also 1, 27 (36%) out of the 75 participants lied. In treatment 2 (1, -10), the number who lied declined to 13 (17%) out of 75, and in treatment 3 (10,-10) it rose to 39 (52%) out of 75 participants.
A statistical comparison of these differences (the p-values are approximated to two decimal places and calculated from the test of the equality of proportions, using normal approximation to the binomial distribution), shows that they are all significant: For the (1989) threshold model assumes that because individuals experience a small fixed disutility from lying, they are honest for all payoffs less than their personal disutility threshold and lie to maximize wealth for all payoffs at or above the threshold. This model cannot explain the difference in behavior between treatment 1 and 2, where the cost for the decision maker is fixed.
The questionnaires
The results of the experiment show that when making choices with real incentives in the laboratory, participants react differently when we change the absolute and relative consequences of their choices. But what do people think about the role of consequences in
lying, and what do they say about the fairness of different lies? I study these issues with a set of questionnaires whose items referred to an empirically likely scenario. In this study, participants were students at the University of Chicago who had volunteered to fill in the questionnaires, and were paid $1 for their participation. Thus, there was no difference between the two scenarios in term of the seller's payoffs. On the other hand, the buyer's cost increased from $250 to $1,000. I used both a between-subjects design (i.e., each subject was confronted with one question, until the line saying "what would be…"), with N=50 students answering each question, and a withinsubject design (i.e., the subjects answered the question for both parameters as it presented above), with N=50. The students' responses are presented in Figure 2a The difference between the answers to the first and second question in the betweensubjects design is significant (p<.05).
13 Inspection of the within subjects design shows a large difference in choices: In the $250 cost question, 70% of the participants chose "unfair" and 18% chose "very unfair." In the $1,000 question, only 32% chose "unfair," but 66% chose 13 In all questions I use both Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxson rank-sum tests. 4  11  3  3  36  3  4  12  3  3  37  3  4  13  3  3  38  3  4  14  3  3  39  3  4  15  3  3  40  3  4  16  3  3  41  3  4  17  3  3  42  4  4 14 The differences between the replies to the first and second question are smaller in the between-subjects design.
In the within-subjects design, people apparently wanted to emphasis that lying is worse when the costs for the buyer were higher, and consequently they answered only "unfair" to the first question. We see that in the withinsubjects design 70% chose "unfair" to the first questions, while in the between-subjects design only 48% chose this response.
The basic finding here is that people think it is less fair to lie the higher the cost for the other side. This intuition can be strengthened if we consider a third scenario in which the problem lies with the brakes, and the risk for the buyer is an automobile accident.
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To establish the robustness of the findings from the car sale scenario, a second set of questions regarding purchasing a house was transmitted (N=50).
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Mr. Johnson is about to close a deal on the sale of his house for $250,000. The roof of the house is in poor condition, and Mr. Johnson knows that if the buyer learns of this, he will have to reduce the price by $5,000 (the cost of fixing the roof). If Mr. Johnson doesn't tell the buyer, the roof will leak on the first rainy day: The resulting damage for the buyer will be $5,000. It is summer, and the only way the buyer can learn about this now is if Mr. Johnson were to tell him. Otherwise, the buyer will learn about the roof only on the next rainy day, expected only in two months.
Mr. Johnson chose not to tell the buyer about the problems with the roof.
In your opinion, Mr. Johnson's behavior is (please circle one):
Completely fair Fair Unfair Very unfair
What would your answer be if the cost of fixing the damage for the buyer in case Mr.
Johnson does not tell him is $25,000 instead of $5,000?
15 When this question was asked of 20 subjects at the University of Chicago, they found it insulting, and unworthy of an answer. 16 Since this is a robustness test for the previous question, I used only a within-subjects design.
As can be seen in Figure 3 and buyer's cost is either $5,000 or $25,000.
As can be seen from buyer's cost is either $5,000 or $25,000.
Formulation of deception preferences
Based on these empirical findings I now turn to formulate the preferences for deception.
Related literature on fairness:
A large body of empirical evidence has accumulated against the assumption of complete selfishness. 17 To accommodate these findings, researchers have developed formal models of social preferences that assume people are self-interested, but are also concerned about the payoffs to others. The game theoretic models of fairness can be classified into two prominent classes: models that focus on distributional concerns, and models that focus on intentions. In the distributional models, agent's preferences are influenced by the final distribution of payoffs. For example, in Kirchsteiger (1992) , Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , it is assumed that for a given own material payoff, a person's utility decreases with the difference between the own-payoff and that of the counterpart.
Intention models (see Rabin, 1993, and Kirchsteiger, 2001 ) assume that intentions play a crucial role when individuals are motivated by reciprocity considerations:
When considering the final distribution, the process that led to that distribution is important.
Charness and Rabin (2001), and Falk and Fischbacher (1998) have developed theories that combine elements of both approaches.
The experimental game describe in this paper is similar to the dictator game in the sense that player 1 has rational expectations that player 2 will most likely follow the message she sends. Hence player 1 basically decides on the payoff distribution for the two players.
The distribution models seem more adequate for this game than the intention models because the discussion is restricted to situations in which the second mover is a "dummy," leaving no place for reciprocity or intentions matching by player 2.
However, when one tries to use a distribution model in the above game, the model fails to predict the observed behavior. For example, consider a case in which player 1 has to choose between {$6 for herself and $5 for the other}, and {$5 for herself and $15 for the other}. According to the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) This last term is always positive given the above restrictions, meaning that the model predicts the choice of {6, 5} over {5, 15}. Moreover, keeping all else constant, the more player 2 earns in the second option, the smaller is the probability that player 1 will choose it! This seems like a good result when modeling envy, but not deception. I believe the reason for this is that a simple comparison of relative payoffs misses an important aspect of the deception problem, namely the distinction between doing harm and inequality aversion. In other words, people care not only about relative final outcomes, they also care about the harm done by their choices.
The intention models described above assume that people care whether the other player was "nice" to them or not. The argument I offer here is different since in "harm doing" environments, people also care about the role of their own intentions in reaching the final distribution of payoffs. To summarize, fairness models that proved highly useful in explaining/predicting behavior in distributive games based on the assumption of inequality aversion or a preference for matching the other side's behavior, cannot be directly used to investigate deception and doing harm.
It is also the case that the standard treatment of aversion to harm doing as altruism cannot capture the phenomenon. Andreoni's (1995) compares experiments on privately provided public goods, where people tend to cooperate, with experiments on oligopolies, where a Nash equilibrium is usually observed. By constructing an experiment with different frames but the same payoff space, Andreoni (1995) is able to reject the hypothesis of pure altruism in favor of impure altruism in which "warm-glow" or the utility from the act of doing good motivates behavior. Furthermore, Andreoni (1995, p.11) states that "…there is no theory of the disutility individuals may get from the act of doing bad…" He notes the asymmetry between the marginal utility of helping when help is framed as a positive externality, and when it is framed as a negative externality.
To test the claim that harm doing behavior is different from altruism (pure or impure), I conducted a simple dictator game experiment in which a player had to choose between the monetary options described in treatment 1 in the above experiment ({6, 5} or {5, 6}). Only 34% of the participants (as compared with 64% who chose to send the true message in the deception game) chose the latter option. From these results I conclude that it is not only care for others that motivates behavior, but also aversion to lie. Note that this shows that the utilitarian assumption about consequentialism is rejected. People's choice reflects nonconsequentialist preferences since they treat the choice between (5, 6) and (6, 5) differently depending on the process (a simple choice or a lie) leading to it.
Preference for deception:
In order to incorporate aversion to doing harm in a simple formulation, I assume that people have preferences over the consequences of their actions. Unlike the fairness models described above, the preferences I assume relate to the consequences of choices, not final outcomes. That is, I am not looking at the final distribution of payoffs, but rather at the potential changes in payoffs resulting from a lie. This formulation involves a decision maker who has to choose whether to lie. The truth-telling payoffs are used as a reference level against which the decision maker compares the payoffs associated with the lie. This use of reference dependent utility has another nice feature: In real world trade (unlike controlled experiments), the absolute value of a deal to the other side is usually unknown, meaning that at the decision (actual signing) stage, final outcomes to the other side are unknown. For example, in the car sale scenario above, what is the absolute value of the deal to the buyer?
We know how much she pays for the car, but that is not her payoff, since we do not know her utility from owning the car. The cost of fixing the car is much more likely to be known to the seller.
Consider a two-player deception game in which player 1 has to choose whether to deceive player 2. There is no strategic uncertainty. The outcome associated with the lie is an increase in payoffs to player 1 and a decrease in payoffs to player 2, relative to telling the truth. 18 The following formulation is suggested to represent player 1's preferences over the two options: Player 1 has the choice between T ("tell the truth") and L ("lie"). Let X T be the 
where α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) denotes the relative weight player 1 places on her own payoff. To Of special interest in Figure 4 is the intersection of the lines with the horizontal axis:
The points at which player 1 is assumed to be indifferent between lying and not lying. That is, at these points the utility from lying equals the utility of telling the truth. For larger costs for player 2, the utility from lying is smaller than the utility from not lying, while the reverse holds for lower costs to player 2. The equation of these points is a quadratic function in the form:
These points, for α=.5, are plotted in Figure 5 . The equation is simply player 1's indifference curve. For values above the curve she will lie, for values below the curve she will not lie. Note that the quadratic function implies that the higher the gain for player 1, the less she cares about the relative cost for player 2.
19
19 This assumption is similar to Rabin's (1993 Rabin's ( , p.1291 assumption that "I now turn to the case in which material payoffs are very large. Proposition 5 states essentially that as material payoffs become large, the players' behavior is dominated by material self-interest. In particular, players will play only Nash equilibria if the scale of payoffs is large enough." See Nelson (2001) The experiment with the game allows us to ascertain how many indifference curves were crossed when moving from one point to the other. This will be done in the next section.
However, a word of caution is in place. Is it sensible to assume that each person will display the same α in all situations? In one of the classical studies in social psychology, Hartshorne and May (1928, see Ross and Nisbett, 1991 , for a more general discussion), examined the honesty of school children in classroom and real-life situations. For example, they tested the willingness of children to lie to avoid getting another child into trouble, and their willingness to cheat by adding false scores to a classroom test where detection seemed impossible. Many of the specific behaviors studied were examined more than once. For example, the researchers measured children's willingness to cheat on each of several similar classroom tests. The average correlation Hartshorne and May (1928) obtained between any one type of honesty behavior and any other type was only .23. This suggests that the parameter describing concern for others may vary between deception situations even for the same person.
Deception versus choices between allocations
As mentioned, comparing a choice between the same allocations in the dictator game versus the deception game results in significantly different results. I believe the force driving this difference is player 1's intentions. Player 1 is more willing to harm player 2 when her behavior is "innocent" than when she lies. This of course does not mean that the same type of formulation cannot be used to account for choices between allocations in the dictator game. It only means that participants assign different α to different intentions. The formulation can also be generalized to choices between many options, and to allow for envy to enter the decision process. Testing this conclusion and the relevant α as well as developing a more general model of choice is behind the scope of the current paper.
From empirical findings to the formulation
All the studies reported above supported the conclusion that people do care about the cost they impose on their counterpart when lying. For example, in the experiment, when the profit for player 1 was 1 and the cost for player 2 was 1, 36% of the participants lied.
Increasing the cost for player 2 from 1 to 10, resulted in a significant drop in lying to only 17% of the participants. This trend can be interpreted as "moving down" in A similar exercise in line with the preference formulation, shows that for ∆y =-10, increasing the profit for player 1 from 1 to 10 results in a significant increase in the fraction of people that were willing to lie (from .17 to .52, i.e., the indifference curve of 35% of the participants is crossed). Finally, to justify the quadratic shape of the preferences, note that multiplying both ∆x and ∆y by 10 results in a significant increase in the fraction of people who are willing to lie (from .36 to .52, i.e., the indifference cure of 16% of the participants is crossed). This shows that the formulation is able to capture the general structure of behavior in the empirical studies.
Extensions: The relative importance of consequences

A richer counterpart
A potential liar may weight changes in payoffs relative to the wealth of both sides.
For example, insurance markets have asymmetry in the wealth of the two sides. The above formulation prescribes that people are more likely to lie to insurance companies than to private people, because the damage to a private person is relatively greater than the damage to a large company. Holding the costs and benefits of fraud constant, consumers' attitudes toward the acceptability of fraud affect the fraud rate. Tennyson (1997) uses consumer surveys to reveal a wide acceptance of practices that would normally be termed fraudulent, and a general perception that such practices are commonplace when the target of the fraud is a large institution. For example, in a survey reported by the Insurance Research Council (1991), consumers were asked to rate the acceptability of a wide range of insurance fraud activities; nearly 11% of the responders found it "almost always" acceptable to allow a doctor or a lawyer to submit medical bills for treatments not received (see Tennyson, 1997 for an extensive discussion of the findings). Would the result hold if the fraud were aimed at an individual person rather than a large and rich company?
This conjecture is also of interest in labor relationships. Employers are usually wealthier than employees. Strahlberg (2001, p. 30) The difference is significant both in the between-subjects and the within-subjects investigation (p<.01 in both cases and both tests). Participants find lying more acceptable for the employee than for the employer (in the within-subjects treatment, 19 (38%) indicated that it is more fair when the employee lie, see Table 4 ). My interpretation of this result is that the participants perceive $25,000 as much more financially meaningful to the prospective employee than to the bank; hence, it is more acceptable for her than for the bank to lie. A simple way to integrate this into the model is by assuming that the decision maker does not simply use ∆y, but rather considers the change in utility caused by a monetary reduction of ∆y. Assume for example that player 1 considers player 2's utility to be concave.
In that case, the richer player 2 is (the more to the right she is on her utility function), the smaller will be the reduction in player 2's utility for a given ∆y. Hence, the richer player 2 would be, the higher the chance player 1 would lie. A similar argument may be used to explain why a poorer player 1 would be more likely to lie than a richer player 1.
In many cases potential liars do not know the exact cost a lie inflicts on the other side and are required to estimate it. A series of studies (e.g., Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff and Camerer, 1995, and Babcock, Wang, and Loewenstein 1996) 
Extending the formulation to account for absolute payoffs
Absolute payoffs may also be important in the decision whether to lie or not. The and commodities?). In these cases, the formulation proposed in section 5 can likewise be used.
Discussion
When do people lie? This paper sheds some light on the propensity of people to lie in situations where no penalty is associated with lying. The analysis is based on consequences, that is, changes in wealth resulting from a lie. These consequences turn out to have an important effect on behavior. People care how much they gain from a lie, but also about how much the other side loses (this unselfish motive diminishes with the size of the gains).
The by an employee to an employer than vice versa.
Finally, the formulation presented in this paper can be used also for studying other aspects of harm doing, not necessarily lies. However, the findings indicate that the decision maker is not indifferent to the process leading to the outcome. That is, people have nonconsequentialism preferences in which they treat the same outcome differently depending on the process leading to it. The task of generalize the model to different scenarios of damaging others is beyond the scope of the current paper, yet I certainly view it as an interesting task.
Instructions for player 2
This is a short experiment in decision-making. In this experiment you will be matched with another student from a different class. Neither of you will ever know the identity of the other. The money that you earn will be paid to you next week, privately and in cash.
Two possible monetary payments are available to you and your counterpart in the experiment. The payments depend on the option chosen by you. We showed the two payment options to your counterpart. The only information you will have is the message your counterpart sends to you.
The two possible messages could be sent:
Message 1: "Option A will earn you more money than option B."
Message 2: ""Option B will earn you more money than option A."
Your counterpart decided to send you message:_______ We now ask you to choose either option A or option B. Your choice will determine the payments in the experiment. You will never know what the actual payment was in the option not chosen (that is, if the message sent by your counterpart was true or not).
Moreover, you will never know how much money your counterpart could be paid with the other option.
We will pay the two of you according to the choice you make.
I choose (please circle one):
Option A Option B
